Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors by Mingyu Guo
Strategy-proof Allocation of Multiple Items between Two
Agents without Payments or Priors
∗
Mingyu Guo
Duke University
Department of Computer Science
Durham, NC, USA
mingyu@cs.duke.edu
Vincent Conitzer
Duke University
Department of Computer Science
Durham, NC, USA
conitzer@cs.duke.edu
ABSTRACT
Weinvestigatetheproblemofallocatingitems(privategoods)among
competing agents in a setting that is both prior-free and payment-
free. Speciﬁcally, we focus on allocating multiple heterogeneous
items between two agents with additive valuation functions. Our
objective is to design strategy-proof mechanisms that are compet-
itive against the most efﬁcient (ﬁrst-best) allocation. We intro-
duce the family of linear increasing-price (LIP) mechanisms. The
LIP mechanisms are strategy-proof, prior-free, and payment-free,
and they are exactly the increasing-price mechanisms satisfying a
strong responsiveness property. We show how to solve for compet-
itive mechanisms within the LIP family. For the case of two items,
we ﬁnd a LIP mechanism whose competitive ratio is near optimal
(the achieved competitive ratio is 0.828, while any strategy-proof
mechanism is at most 0.841-competitive). As the number of items
goes to inﬁnity, we prove a negative result that any increasing-price
mechanism (linear or nonlinear) has a maximal competitive ratio of
0.5. Our results imply that in some cases, it is possible to design
good allocation mechanisms without payments and without priors.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences—
Economics; I.2.11 [Distributed Artiﬁcial Intelligence]: Multia-
gent Systems
General Terms
Economics, Theory
Keywords
Mechanism design, prior-free, payment-free
1. INTRODUCTION
We investigate the problem of allocating items (private goods)
among competing agents in a setting that is both prior-free and
payment-free. That is, we do not assume that we have knowl-
edge about the distribution of the agents’ valuations. We also do
not allow the mechanism to specify any monetary payments. This
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is useful in settings where no currency has (yet) been established
(as may be the case, for example, in a peer-to-peer network, as
well as in many other multiagent systems); or where payments are
prohibited by law; or where payments are otherwise inconvenient.
Speciﬁcally, we focus on allocating multiple heterogeneous items
between two agents with additive valuation functions. Our objec-
tive is to design strategy-proof mechanisms that are competitive
against the efﬁcient (ﬁrst-best) allocation.
It remains an open question to give an elegant characterization
of mechanisms that are strategy-proof, prior-free, and payment-free
(for the problem that we study), and we do not know how to solve
for the most competitive such mechanism in general. In our at-
tempts to design competitive mechanisms, we introduce the family
of linear increasing-price (LIP) mechanisms, which are based on a
certain artiﬁcial currency. The LIP mechanisms are strategy-proof,
prior-free, and payment-free. We show how to solve for competi-
tive mechanisms within the LIP family. For the case of two items,
we ﬁnd a LIP mechanism whose competitive ratio is near optimal
(the achieved competitive ratio is 0.828, while any strategy-proof
mechanism is at most 0.841-competitive). Thus, at least for the
case of two items, it does not come at much of a loss to focus only
on LIP mechanisms. As the number of items goes to inﬁnity, we
prove a negative result that any increasing-price mechanism (linear
or nonlinear) has a maximal competitive ratio of 0.5.
By proposing speciﬁc competitive strategy-proof mechanisms
that do not rely on payments, our paper also helps to answer a
question that has recently been drawing the attention of computer
scientists: Are priors and payments necessary for designing good
mechanisms? The idea of designing strategy-proof mechanisms
without payments that achieve competitive performance was ex-
plicitly framed by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [22], in their paper
titled Approximate Mechanism Design Without Money. That paper
carries out a case study on locating a public facility for agents with
single-peaked valuations. (The general idea of approximate mech-
anism design without payments dates back further, at least to work
by Dekel et al. [10] in a machine learning framework.)
Our paper considers this question in the different context of al-
location mechanisms.
1 Unlike the models studied in the above two
papers [10, 22], where a consensus agreement may exist, when we
are considering the allocation of private goods, the agents are nec-
essarily in conﬂict.
2 Nevertheless, it turns out that even here, some
1Guo and Conitzer [15] also studied the problem of designing com-
petitive allocation mechanisms without payments, but in a repeated
setting. Another difference between [15] and this paper is that the
mechanisms proposed in [15] are Bayes-Nash incentive compatible
instead of strategy-proof.
2For example, both [10] and [22] proposed mechanisms that pick
the “median” report from the agents as the ﬁnal outcome. When
the agents’ favorite outcomes are identical, the median report is thepositive results can be obtained. Thus, we believe that our results
provide additional insights for this line of research. Of course, it
is beyond the scope of this paper to answer the above question in
its general form; rather, we will be content to focus speciﬁcally on
designing prior-free, payment-free allocation mechanisms.
Resource allocation mechanisms with payments have been stud-
ied extensively in both economics and computer science. Related
work that does not require a prior distribution includes the follow-
ing. For two agents, McAfee [18] analyzes equilibrium behavior
under three simple mechanisms whose description does not rely on
the prior distribution over the agents’ valuations. They are the ﬁrst-
price, the second-price, and the cake-cutting mechanisms.
3 For
the case of three or more agents, the family of VCG redistribution
mechanisms are efﬁcient, strategy-proof, and (ex post) individually
rational. VCG redistribution mechanisms are Groves mechanisms
that allocate resources according to the VCG (Clarke) mechanism,
and then redistribute a large portion of the VCG payments back to
the agents [2, 8, 21, 14, 13, 19]. The above papers aim to maxi-
mize social welfare. Prior-free approaches have also been used for
revenue maximization, such as in digital goods auctions [1, 17, 12].
There is also a rich literature on mechanisms without payments.
A survey is given in the book chapter by Schummer and Vohra [23].
Barberà [3] gives an introduction to strategy-proof social choice
functions. Budish [6] gives a nice survey of existing allocation
mechanisms without payments that are designed for practical usage
(e.g., thepatentedAdjustedWinnerProcedure[5]). Allthesemech-
anisms are manipulable except for the Serial Dictatorship mecha-
nism in Budish and Cantillon [7], in which the authors study user
behavior in Harvard Business School course allocation. Several pa-
pers suggest that in particular settings, strategy-proof mechanisms
without payments, combined with various other restrictions (e.g.,
efﬁciency), must come down to mechanisms that are, in a sense,
dictatorial [20, 11, 24]. The proposed linear increasing-price mech-
anisms in our paper are also dictatorial in nature. Mechanism de-
sign without payments has also been studied in[16, 9].
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2. MODEL DESCRIPTION
We study the problem of allocating m (m > 1) heterogeneous
items (referred to as items 1 to m) between two agents (referred to
as agents 1 and 2). We use −i to denote the agent other than i.
Let O be the set of all possible allocations. An allocation o ∈ O
is denoted by a vector (p1,p2,...,pm) (0 ≤ pj ≤ 1 for all j),
where pj is the proportion
5 of item j won by agent 1 (so that 1−pj
is the proportion of item j won by agent 2).
We assume that the agents’ valuations for the items are additive,
andthattheagentsareriskneutral. Weuseavector(v
i
1,v
i
2,...,v
i
m)
to denote agent i’s type, where v
i
j is agent i’s valuation for winning
consensus agreement for all the agents. When allocating private
goods (without externalities), consensus agreement never exists—
every agent wants every good. Of course, in the worst case (all of
these papers are based on worst-case analysis), the agents in the
earlier papers are also in conﬂict.
3In fact, the cake-cutting mechanism is payment-free. However, it
is not strategy-proof in our sense. In the literature on cake-cutting
mechanisms [4], strategy-proofness has another, much weaker
meaning: An agent can not guarantee a better result by cheating,
given that she is ignorant about the other agent’s type.
4The recently proposed qualitative Vickrey auction[16], a gener-
alization of the traditional Vickrey auction, is another mechanism
that does not rely on monetary payments. However, it can not be
applied to our problem as it requires that there will be only a single
winner, and that the center has preferences over the outcomes.
5For indivisible items, pj is interpreted as the probability that agent
1 wins item j.
item j (v
i
j ≥ 0). Additivity and risk neutrality imply that under
allocation (p1,p2,...,pm), agent 1’s utility equals
P
j pjv
1
j and
agent 2’s utility equals
P
j(1 − pj)v
2
j.
Furthermore, we require that the agents’ valuations are normal-
ized. That is, the type space V consists of vectors (v1,v2,...,vm)
with
P
j vj = 1. As a result, an agent’s utility for an allocation
can be thought of as her level of satisfaction; if an agent wins all
the items, then she is 100% satisﬁed. The reason that we require
this normalization is the following. When payments are available
and utility is quasilinear, this provides a way of comparing valua-
tions between agents. However, because payments are unavailable
in our context, it is no longer possible to make such a compari-
son. Hence, the units in which valuations are expressed become
meaningless, so that the only meaning that can be derived from an
agent’s valuations is the relative valuations of the items (the ra-
tio of the valuations). If we (say) doubled one agent’s valuation
for every item, in our payment-free context this would double that
agent’s utility for every outcome, and as a result her behavior under
any mechanism would remain completely unchanged. As a result,
there can be no hope of coming anywhere close to maximizing the
social welfare without some normalization assumption.
A payment-free mechanism M : V × V → O maps the agents’
reported type vectors to an allocation. Let u
i(  v,o) be agent i’s
utility under allocation o when her true type is   v. Mechanism M
is said to be strategy-proof if: ∀i ∈ {1,2},   vi,   v′
i and   v−i, we have
u
i(  vi,M(  vi,   v−i)) ≥ u
i(  vi,M(  v′
i,   v−i)). In words, a mechanism
is strategy-proof if no matter what the other agent reports, each
agent’s best strategy is to report truthfully.
Wedeﬁnetheﬁrst-bestallocationmechanismM
∗ tobethemech-
anism that always naïvely maximizes the social welfare (without
consideringincentives). Thatis, ∀  v1,   v2, M
∗(  v1,   v2) ∈ argmaxo∈O P
i∈{1,2} u
i(  vi,o).
We will use the ﬁrst-best mechanism M
∗ (which is not strategy-
proof)asourbenchmarkwhenevaluatingtheperformanceofstrategy-
proof mechanisms. (When using M
∗ as a benchmark, we assume
that agents report truthfully, even though they are not incentivized
to do so. Hence, M
∗ always produces the maximal social welfare
among all mechanisms, with or without priors, and with or without
payments.)
Strategy-proofmechanismM issaidtobe(atleast)α-competitive
if the social welfare under M is always greater than or equal to α
times the social welfare under M
∗. Here α is called M’s competi-
tive ratio. The maximal possible value of α is called M’s maximal
competitive ratio.
Deﬁnition 1. Strategy-proof mechanism M is α-competitive
against the ﬁrst-best mechanism M
∗ if ∀  v1,   v2, we have
P
i∈{1,2} u
i(  vi,M(  v1,   v2)) ≥ α
P
i∈{1,2} u
i(  vi,M
∗(  v1,   v2))
Example 1. Themechanismthatalwaysdivideseveryitemevenly
has maximal competitive ratio 0.5. The mechanism that always
gives every item to agent 1 also has maximal competitive ratio 0.5.
Our objective is to design strategy-proof mechanisms with high
competitive ratios.
3. UPPERBOUNDONTHECOMPETITIVE
RATIOS OF STRATEGY-PROOF
MECHANISMS
In this section, we derive an upper bound on the competitive ra-
tios of strategy-proof mechanisms. Given our objective, we onlyneed to consider strategy-proof mechanisms that are symmetric.
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Deﬁnition 2. A mechanism M is symmetric if it satisﬁes
Symmetry over the agents: If we swap the reported type vectors
of two of the agents, then the items allocated to these agents are
also swapped.
Symmetry over the items: If we swap agent 1’s valuations for
any two items, and we swap agent 2’s valuations for the same two
items, then the allocation result for these two items is also swapped.
CLAIM 1. For any strategy-proof mechanism that is
α-competitive, there is a corresponding symmetric strategy-proof
mechanism that is (at least) α-competitive.
We omit some of the proofs due to space constraint.
CLAIM 2. For the case of two agents, any symmetric strategy-
proof mechanism is (at least) 0.5-competitive.
Claim 1 implies that for the purpose of deriving an upper bound
on the competitive ratios of strategy-proof mechanisms, we can
safely ignore strategy-proof mechanisms that are not symmetric.
Let us recall that a mechanism M is α-competitive if for all pos-
sible type vectors, the social welfare under M is at least α times the
social welfare under the ﬁrst-best mechanism M
∗. If we restrict the
type space, then the maximal competitive ratio of M can only stay
the same or increase. That is, one way to compute an upper bound
on the competitive ratios of strategy-proof mechanisms is to restrict
the type space and then solve for the largest possible competitive
ratio for any strategy-proof mechanism.
THEOREM 1. Thecompetitiveratioofanystrategy-proofmech-
anism is at most 0.841. This is true for any number of items and
two agents.
PROOF. We ﬁrstfocus on thecase oftwoitems. We considerthe
following restricted type space: {(ih,(N −i)h)|i = 0,1,...,N},
where N = 50 and h = 1/N. Type vector (ih,(N − i)h) can
be denoted by the integer i. A mechanism for this restricted type
space can be denoted by the p
i
jk for i = 1,2 and 0 ≤ j,k ≤ N,
where p
i
jk is the proportion of item i won by agent 1 when agent
1’s report is j and agent 2’s report is k.
Strategy-proofness for agent 1 can then be represented by the
following set of linear inequalities: ∀ 0 ≤ j,j
′,k ≤ N
jp
1
jk + (N − j)p
2
jk ≥ jp
1
j′k + (N − j)p
2
j′k
Strategy-proofness for agent 2 can be represented by a similar
set of linear inequalities involving the p
i
jk.
The mechanism characterized by the p
i
jk is α-competitive if the
following linear inequalities are satisﬁed: ∀ 0 ≤ j,k ≤ N
jp
1
jk + (N − j)p
2
jk + k(1 − p
1
jk) + (N − k)(1 − p
2
jk) ≥
α(max{j,k} + max{N − j,N − k})
The largest possible competitive ratio for any mechanism and for
the above restricted type space can thus be computed by solving a
linear program, which results in 0.841.
7 Any strategy-proof mech-
anism for the case of m > 2 items remains strategy-proof when
applied to the case of two items (when the agents do not care about
the other items). Hence, the upper bound 0.841 still applies.
6This is a frequently used technique in the literature on prior-free
mechanism design.
7We acknowledge that a computer-assisted proof is not as satis-
factory as an easily human-veriﬁable mathematical proof. Because
this is a linear programming problem, in principle, we can give a
(nearly) optimal solution to the dual problem to show that it is im-
possible to better; we do not give such a solution here because it
does not seem to shed much light.
4. LINEAR INCREASING-PRICE
MECHANISMS
As mentioned earlier, it remains an open question to solve for
the most competitive strategy-proof mechanism in general. There
are two reasons for this: ﬁrst, we lack an elegant characterization
of all strategy-proof mechanisms for our problem; second, we lack
a general approach for evaluating a given mechanism (computing
its maximal competitive ratio).
In our attempts to design competitive mechanisms, we start with
the family of all strategy-proof mechanisms (SP). We then move on
to more and more restricted families of mechanisms: the family of
swap-dictatorial mechanisms (SD), the family of increasing-price
mechanisms (IP), and ﬁnally the family of linear increasing-price
mechanisms (LIP). These 4 families are nested as illustrated below:
LIP   IP   SD   SP
As we move from SP to LIP, we get more and more elegant
characterizations of the mechanisms. Finally, the mechanisms in
the LIP family can actually be characterized by a single parameter,
and we are able to evaluate (the competitiveness of) any given LIP
mechanism. That is, we are able to solve for competitive mecha-
nisms within the LIP family.
In a payment-free setting, if we ﬁx agent −i’s report, then agent
i essentially faces a set of allowable outcomes that she can choose
from (each outcome corresponds to an allowable report of i). A
necessary condition for a mechanism to be strategy-proof is that
the mechanism should always choose i’s favorite outcome (among
all allowable outcomes). This condition is not sufﬁcient for the
mechanism to be strategy-proof for both agents, because agent −i
may have the power to change the set of allowable outcomes that
agent i faces. That is, −i may want to submit a false report to get
agent i to a decision −i prefers. However, if we require that the set
of allowable outcomes agent i faces is ﬁxed, then the mechanism
that picks i’s favorite outcome is strategy-proof for both agents. Es-
sentially, in such a mechanism, agent i is the dictator: she chooses
her favorite outcome from a set of outcomes predetermined by the
mechanism, and agent −i has no choice but to accept this outcome
(the decision is solely made by i). This leads to the following fam-
ily of swap-dictatorial mechanisms (by Claim 1, we only need to
consider symmetric mechanisms):
Swap-Dictatorial Mechanisms: With probability 0.5, agent i is
the dictator, who chooses her favorite allocation from a predeﬁned
set of allowable allocations ˆ Oi ⊂ O. The ˆ Oi satisfy the following
(symmetry over the agents and the items):
• If(p1,p2,...,pm) ∈ ˆ Oi, then(1−p1,1−p2,...,1−pm) ∈
ˆ O−i for any i.
• If (p1,p2,...,pm) ∈ ˆ Oi, then (pσ(1),pσ(2),...,pσ(m)) ∈
ˆ Oi for any permutation σ and i.
Swap-dictatorial mechanisms, as well as other dictatorial mech-
anisms, have been studied extensively because of their simplicity
(e.g., [7]). Many papers in the literature on mechanisms without
payments suggest that strategy-proofness, combined with various
other properties, can only come down to mechanisms that are dic-
tatorial in nature [20, 11, 24]. However, since we do not assume
additional properties, for our problem, there do exist strategy-proof
mechanisms that are not dictatorial in nature (that is, SD   SP).
For purpose of maximizing social welfare, ideally, we want the
dictator agent to take only items that she really values, and leave
the remaining items to the other agent. This leads to the following
family of increasing-price (IP) mechanisms.Increasing-Price(IP)Mechanisms: Withprobability0.5, agent
i is the dictator, and is endowed with 1 unit of artiﬁcial currency.
The dictator agent can purchase (proportions of) items (from the
mechanism, not from the other agent) with her artiﬁcial currency.
The (proportions of) items not purchased at the end go to the other
agent. Rather than having just a ﬁxed price for each item, there
is a price schedule for each item, and the item becomes more ex-
pensive as the dictator agent buys more of it. The price schedules
are characterized by functions f
i
j : [0,1] → R
+ for i = 1,2 and
j = 1,2,...,m. f
i
j(x) is the instantaneous price per unit charged
to agent i (when i is the dictator) if she demands item j, at the point
where x units of her artiﬁcial currency have already been spent on
item j. By Claim 1, we can simply assume f
i
j = f for all i and j.
Function f is increasing and positive. We also assumef is differen-
tiable. If, at the end, agent i (when she is the dictator) spent x units
of artiﬁcial currency on item j, then she is allocated a proportion R x
0
1
f(t)dt of item j. We will present an example IP mechanism
later in this section (which actually belongs to the more restricted
class of LIP mechanisms).
The intuition for why increasing-price mechanisms might per-
form well is as follows. If the dictator agent demands a large pro-
portion of an item, then she will be paying at a high rate, which
can only happen when she highly values the item. Because prices
are increasing, the optimal strategy for the dictator agent is sim-
ply the greedy strategy: purchase (an inﬁnitesimally small amount
each time) the best deal (the item with the highest value/price ra-
tio) until the artiﬁcial currency runs out. That is, at some point, if
the dictator agent’s valuation for item j is vj, and so far xj units
of artiﬁcial currency have been spent on item j, then the dictator
agent should purchase an inﬁnitesimally small amount of item j
∗,
where j
∗ = argmaxj{
vj
f(xj)}. At the end, for items that have
been partly purchased, the ﬁnal prices must be proportional to the
dictator agent’s valuations:
LEMMA 1. Under an IP mechanisms, if the dictator spends
k1,k2(0 < ki < 1) units of artiﬁcial currency on items 1,2, then
the dictator’s valuations for these items must be f1(k1)   C and
f2(k2)   C for some C.
Anyincreasingandpositivefunctionf correspondstoanincreasing-
price mechanism. Actually, for the purpose of designing competi-
tive mechanisms, we only need to consider functions f that satisfy R 1
0
1
f(t)dt = 1. That is, we only need to consider increasing-price
mechanisms in which the dictator agent gets the entirety of an item
if and only if she spends all her artiﬁcial currency on this item.
CLAIM 3. For the purpose of designing competitive IP mecha-
nisms, we only need to consider increasing-price mechanisms with
f satisfying
R 1
0
1
f(t)dt = 1.
PROOF. If
R 1
0
1
f(t)dt > 1, then there exists U (U < 1) that
satisﬁes
R U
0
1
f(t)dt = 1. ∀0 < ǫ < U, let ˆ f be the same as f
for x ≤ U, and let ˆ f(x) take some very high values for U <
x ≤ 1 (in a way that makes ˆ f increasing), so that
R 1
0
1
ˆ f(t)dt ≤
1+ǫ. Since the dictator agent will never spend more than U units of
artiﬁcial currency on any item (it is pointless for the dictator agent
to continue purchasing an item when she has already obtained the
entirety of this item), on the region that matters to the mechanism
(0 ≤ x ≤ U), f and ˆ f areidentical. Thus, weonlyneedtoconsider
functions f satisfying
R 1
0
1
f(t)dt ≤ 1 + ǫ for arbitrary small value
ǫ. That is, we only need to consider cases where
R 1
0
1
f(t) ≤ 1.
If
R 1
0
1
f(t)dt = p < 1, then let ˆ f = pf, so that we have
R 1
0
1
ˆ f(t)dt = 1. We denote the proportion of item j won by agent i
under f when i is the dictator by q
i
j. The proportion of item j won
by agent i under f when i is not the dictator is then 1 − q
−i
j . The
proportion of item j won by agent i under ˆ f when i is the dictator is
qi
j
p (under ˆ f, a dictator gets
1
p times as much item per unit of artiﬁ-
cialcurrencyateveryamountofcurrencyspent), andtheproportion
of item j won by agent i under ˆ f when i is not the dictator is 1 −
q−i
j
p . The social welfare under f equals
P
i,j
qi
jvi
j+(1−q−i
j )vi
j
2 . The
social welfare under ˆ f equals
P
i,j
qi
jvi
j/p+(1−q−i
j /p)vi
j
2 , which is
at least 1 (as in the proof of Claim 2). It turns out that the social
welfare under f is always less than or equal to the social welfare
under ˆ f, as proved below.
P
i,j
qi
jvi
j+(1−q−i
j )vi
j
2 =
P
i,j
qi
jvi
j+(p−q−i
j )vi
j+(1−p)vi
j
2 =
P
i,j
qi
jvi
j+(p−q−i
j )vi
j
2 +
P
i,j
(1−p)vi
j
2 =
P
i,j
qi
jvi
j+(p−q−i
j )vi
j
2 + (1 − p) =
p
P
i,j
qi
jvi
j/p+(1−q−i
j /p)vi
j
2 +(1−p) ≤
P
i,j
qi
jvi
j/p+(1−q−i
j /p)vi
j
2 .
Hence, we only need to consider f satisfying
R 1
0
1
f(t) = 1.
Finally, the family of linear increasing-price mechanisms is de-
scribed below:
LinearIncreasing-Price(LIP)Mechanisms: Linearincreasing-
price mechanisms are increasing-price mechanisms characterized
by a linear function f(x) = ax + b, where a and b are positive
constants. (a has to be positive for f to be increasing. b has to
be positive to avoid negative prices or division-by-zero.) Since we
only consider f satisfying
R 1
0
1
f(t)dt = 1, we have b =
a
ea−1.
That is, a LIP mechanism is characterized by a single parameter a.
From now on, we use LIP(a) to denote the LIP mechanism with
parameter a. We use b to denote the value
a
ea−1.
Example 2. Let a = 2 (b =
2
e2−1) and m = 2. Let the
agents’ type vectors be (1,0) and (0.5,0.5), respectively. Un-
der LIP(a), with 0.5 probability, agent 1 is the dictator. Since
agent 1’s type vector is (1,0), she will spend all her artiﬁcial cur-
rency on item 1. The resulting allocation is (1,0): agent 1 wins
the entirety of item 1, while agent 2 gets what is left (the en-
tirety of item 2). With 0.5 probability, agent 2 is the dictator.
Since agent 2’s type vector is (0.5,0.5), she will divide her arti-
ﬁcial currency evenly on items 1 and 2. The resulting allocation
is (1 −
R 0.5
0
1
at+bdt,1 −
R 0.5
0
1
at+bdt) = (0.283,0.283): agent 2
wins
R 0.5
0
1
at+bdt = 0.717 proportion of both item 1 and 2, while
agent 1 gets what is left (1 −
R 0.5
0
1
at+bdt = 0.283 proportion
of both items). In total, the resulting allocation under LIP(a) is
(1 −
1
2
R 0.5
0
1
at+bdt,
1
2 −
1
2
R 0.5
0
1
at+bdt) = (0.642,0.642).
Besides simplicity, the linear increasing-price mechanisms pos-
sessanicepropertythatisnotsharedbyother(non-linear)increasing-
price mechanisms. Before deﬁning this property, we need the fol-
lowing deﬁnitions. Suppose we are considering an IP mechanism
characterized by function f.
Deﬁnition 3. A type vector   v ∈ V is strictly full ranked for f if
a dictator agent with true type   v will purchase positive proportions
of every item under f.
Every strictly full ranked type vector   v = (v1,v2,...,vm) cor-
responds to a vector (t1,t2,...,tm) with
Pm
j=1 tj = 1, where tj
(> 0) denotes the amount of artiﬁcial currency that an agent with
type vector   v will spend on item j (when she is the dictator). The
ﬁnal value/price ratio
vj
f(tj) should be the same for all j (Lemma 1).Deﬁnition 4. Atypevector  v ∈ Visfullrankedif  v ∈ W, where
W is the closure of the set of all strictly full ranked type vectors.
For a full ranked vector   v, we also have that the ﬁnal value/price
ratio
vj
f(tj) should be the same for all j.
Not all type vectors are full ranked type vectors. If an agent
has very low valuations for some items, then she will not spend
any artiﬁcial currency on those items if f(0) is sufﬁciently high.
For small f(0), most type vectors are full ranked. In the rest of this
paper (when solving for the competitive ratios of LIP mechanisms),
we focus on full ranked type vectors, and treat vectors that are not
full ranked as exceptions.
CLAIM 4. For cases of at least three items, LIP mechanisms
are the only IP mechanisms satisfying the following condition:
Strong responsiveness: For two agents with full ranked type vec-
tors, if one agent values an item more than the other agent, then she
should win a greater proportion of this item than the other agent.
We ﬁrst prove the following lemma, which will be also used later
in the paper.
LEMMA 2. Let   v = (v1,v2,...,vm) be a full ranked vector
underLIP(a). Let  v ’spaymentvector(t1,t2,...,tm)(
Pm
j=1 tj =
1) be such that an agent with true type   v will spend tj units of arti-
ﬁcial currency on item j under LIP(a) (when she is the dictator).
Then, the vj and the tj satisfy vj =
atj+b
a+mb for all j.
PROOF. The ﬁnal value/price ratio
vj
atj+b should be the same for
all j, by Lemma 1. Since
P
vj = 1, we have vj =
atj+b
a+mb for all
j.
Now we are ready to prove the above claim.
PROOF OF CLAIM 4. We ﬁrst prove that LIP mechanisms sat-
isfy the strong responsiveness condition.
Lemma 2 says that under a LIP mechanism, an agent’s value
for an item is linear in the amount of artiﬁcial currency this agent
would spend on the item as a dictator. Therefore, if one agent val-
ues an item more than the other agent, then, as the dictator, she
would spend more on this item than the other agent, which means
she wins more of the item at the end.
We now prove that LIP mechanisms are the only IP mechanisms
satisfying the strong responsiveness condition, for cases of at least
three items.
Let us consider an IP mechanism characterized by an increasing
positive function f. If ∃ nonnegative ta,tb,t
′
a,t
′
b, so that 0 ≤ ta +
tb = t
′
a + t
′
b = t ≤ 1 and f(ta) + f(tb) > f(t
′
a) + f(t
′
b) are
both satisﬁed, then we can construct the following full ranked type
vectors:
(
f(1−t)
f(1−t)+f(ta)+f(tb)+(m−3)f(0),
f(ta)
f(1−t)+f(ta)+f(tb)+(m−3)f(0),
f(tb)
f(1−t)+f(ta)+f(tb)+(m−3)f(0),
f(0)
f(1−t)+f(ta)+f(tb)+(m−3)f(0),...,
f(0)
f(1−t)+f(ta)+f(tb)+(m−3)f(0)) and
(
f(1−t)
f(1−t)+f(t′
a)+f(t′
b)+(m−3)f(0),
f(t′
a)
f(1−t)+f(t′
a)+f(t′
b)+(m−3)f(0),
f(t′
b)
f(1−t)+f(t′
a)+f(t′
b)+(m−3)f(0),
f(0)
f(1−t)+f(t′
a)+f(t′
b)+(m−3)f(0),...,
f(0)
f(1−t)+f(t′
a)+f(t′
b)+(m−3)f(0)).
The two vectors are constructed in such a way that agent 1 will
spend 1 − t units of artiﬁcial currency on item 1, ta units on item
2, tb units on item 3, and 0 units on the other items, while agent 2
will spend 1 − t units of artiﬁcial currency on item 1, t
′
a units on
item 2, t
′
b units on item 3, and 0 units on the other items. Agent
1 values item 1 less than agent 2 (the denominator is larger), but
they will spend the same amount of artiﬁcial currency on item 1.
So, they win the same proportion of item 1 at the end. Now if
we increase the value of agent 1 for item 1 by a tiny amount (still
keeping it less than the value of agent 2), then we have a situation
where agent 1 values item 1 less, but wins a greater proportion of
it at the end (agent 1 now spends more on item 1). That is, to
satisfy the strong responsiveness condition, whenever 0 ≤ ta +
tb = t
′
a + t
′
b = t ≤ 1 for nonnegative ta,tb,t
′
a,t
′
b, we must have
f(ta)+f(tb) = f(t
′
a)+f(t
′
b). That is, ∀0 ≤ c ≤ t ≤ 1, we have
f(t)+f(0) = f(t−c)+f(c). Since we assume f is differentiable,
by taking the derivative over t on both sides of the equality, we have
that f
′(t) = f
′(t−c). The values of t and c can be arbitrary. That
is, f
′ is a constant. f must be linear.
The above claim provides another justiﬁcation (other than sim-
plicity) why, among all IP mechanisms, we focus on LIP mecha-
nisms. In the next section, we solve for competitive mechanisms
within the LIP family.
5. COMPETITIVE LINEAR INCREASING-
PRICE MECHANISMS
Since a linear increasing-price mechanism is characterized by a
single parameter, if, for a given value of a, we are able to evaluate
the competitiveness of LIP(a), then the task of solving for com-
petitive LIP mechanisms can be done simply by searching for the
optimal value of a.
In what follows, we discuss how to evaluate the competitiveness
of LIP(a), for a given value of a and a given number of items.
5.1 Two Items
We ﬁrst focus on the case of two items.
We denote the type vectors of agent 1 and 2 by (x,1 − x) and
(y,1 − y), respectively (1 ≥ x ≥ y ≥ 0). We abuse notation by
using x to refer to both the value x and the type vector whose ﬁrst
element is x. We do the same for y.
CLAIM 5. Under LIP(a), with probability 0.5, agent 1 is the
dictator, whose optimal strategy (when she is the dictator) is as
follows.
• If
x
a+b ≥
1−x
b , then agent 1 will spend all her artiﬁcial cur-
rency on item 1. At the end, agent 1 gets item 1 in its entirety
whileagent2getswhat1doesnottake(item2initsentirety).
It should be noted that this is the resulting allocation when
agent 1 is the dictator. When agent 2 is the dictator, we may
get a different allocation.
• If
1−x
a+b ≥
x
b, then agent 1 will spend all her artiﬁcial cur-
rency on item 2. At the end, agent 1 gets item 2 in its entirety
while agent 2 gets item 1 in its entirety.
• Otherwise, agent 1 will spend t =
x(a+2b)−b
a units of arti-
ﬁcial currency on item 1, and 1 − t =
(1−x)(a+2b)−b
a units
of artiﬁcial currency on item 2. At the end, the instanta-
neous prices of items 1 and 2 will be at + b = x(a + 2b)
and a(1 − t) + b = (1 − x)(a + 2b), respectively. (We
note that the prices are proportional to agent 1’s type vec-
tor (x,1 − x), as they should be.) At the end, agent 1 gets
a proportion
ln(at+b)
a −
ln(b)
a of item 1 and a proportion
ln(a(1−t)+b)
a −
ln(b)
a of item 2, while agent 2 gets the re-
mainder.For j = 1,2, we use pj(x,y) to denote the proportion of item j
won by agent 1 at the end, when agent 1’s reported type vector is x
and agent 2’s reported type vector is y. (This proportion takes the
randomization over who is the dictator into account.) The value of
pj(x,y) can be computed as shown above. p1(x,y) is increasing in
x and decreasing in y. p2(x,y) is decreasing in x and increasing in
y. We use S(x,y) to denote the social welfare under LIP(a). That
is, S(x,y) = xp1(x,y)+(1−x)p2(x,y)+y(1−p1(x,y))+(1−
y)(1−p2(x,y)). Thesocial welfare under the ﬁrst-bestmechanism
M
∗ equals x + 1 − y.
By deﬁnition, the maximal competitive ratio of LIP(a) can be
computed as
min
1≥x≥y≥0
S(x,y)
x + 1 − y
We now show how to bound the above expression from both be-
low and above.
Let N be a large positive integer. Let h =
1
N be the step size.
Let the xi be deﬁned as xi = ih for i = 0,1,...,N. Similarly, let
the yi be deﬁned as yi = ih for i = 0,1,...,N.
We have that
min
1≥x≥y≥0
S(x,y)
x + 1 − y
≥ min
N>i≥j≥0
{ min
xi + h ≥ x ≥ xi
yj + h ≥ y ≥ yj
S(x,y)
xi + h + 1 − yj
}
≥ min
N>i≥j≥0
xip1(xi,yj + h) + (1 − xi − h)p2(xi + h,yj)
+yj(1 − p1(xi + h,yj))
+(1 − yj − h)(1 − p2(xi,yj + h))
xi + h + 1 − yj
We also have that
min
1≥x≥y≥0
S(x,y)
x + 1 − y
≤ min
N≥i≥j≥0
S(xi,yj)
xi + 1 − yj
= min
N≥i≥j≥0
xip1(xi,yj) + (1 − xi)p2(xi,yj)
+yj(1 − p1(xi,yj))
+(1 − yj)(1 − p2(xi,yj))
xi + 1 − yj
We note that the xi and the yi are constants. The values of the
pk(xi,yj) are also constants (for ﬁxed a). That is, based on the
above two inequalities, we are able to compute a constant upper
boundandaconstantlowerboundonthemaximalcompetitiveratio
of LIP(a). When a = 2, the lower bound is 0.828. Since any
lower bound on the maximal competitive ratio is also a competitive
ratio, LIP(2) is (at least) 0.828-competitive. That is, the obtained
LIP(2) mechanism is near optimal for the case of two items (we
recall that Theorem 1 says that any strategy-proof mechanism is at
most 0.841-competitive).
THEOREM 2. For the case of two items and two agents, the
competitive ratio of LIP(2) is at least 0.828, and at most 0.829.
5.2 Three or More Items
With more than two items, we need a different technique to
bound the maximal competitive ratio of a given LIP mechanism.
Let α be the maximal competitive ratio of LIP(a) (for some
given a and m). Let W be the set of full ranked type vectors under
LIP(a). Let α
W be the maximal competitive ratio of LIP(a) if
we restrict the type space to W. The following claim says that a
lower bound on α can be obtained based on α
W.
CLAIM 6. Let α be the maximal competitive ratio of LIP(a).
Let α
W be the maximal competitive ratio of LIP(a) if we restrict
the type space to the set of full ranked type vectors W. We have
a + b
a + 2mb
α
W ≤ α
Before proving this claim, let us introduce the following deﬁni-
tion and lemma.
Deﬁnition 5. Let   v = (v1,v2,...,vm), which may or may not
be full ranked. Let   v ’s payment vector (t1,t2,...,tm) be such
that an agent with true type   v will spend tj units of artiﬁcial cur-
rency on item j (when she is the dictator). We deﬁne φ(  v) =
(v
′
1,v
′
2,...,v
′
m), where v
′
j =
atj+b
a+mb for all j. That is, φ(  v) is
the (unique) full ranked type vector corresponding to the payment
vector of   v.
If   v is already full ranked, then φ(  v) =   v. In any case, an agent
with true type φ(  v) will act in the same way as an agent with true
type   v, since their corresponding payment vectors are the same.
LEMMA 3. ∀  v = (v1,v2,...,vm),∀j, letφ(  v) = (v
′
1,...,v
′
m).
Then, we have vj +
b
a+mb ≥ v
′
j and vj
a+b
a+mb ≤ v
′
j. That is, if we
change   v into φ(  v), the value of an element increases at most by
b
a+mb, and the value of an element decreases at most by a factor of
a+b
a+mb.
PROOF. Let (t1,t2,...,tm) be the payment vector of   v and
φ(  v). Let S = {j|tj > 0,j = 1,2,...,m} and T = {j|tj =
0,j = 1,2,...,m}. We have that for all j ∈ S,
vj
atj+b = C
for a common constant C. We also have that for all j ∈ T, C ≥
vj
atj+b =
vj
b .
We get
P
j∈S vj = C(a + |S|b). We also get
P
j∈T vj ≤
C(|T|b). Since
P
j∈S∪T vj = 1, we have C(a + mb) ≥ 1. That
is, for j ∈ S, vj ≥
atj+b
a+mb = v
′
j. For j ∈ T, v
′
j =
b
a+mb.
Therefore, for any j, vj +
b
a+mb ≥ v
′
j.
Since
P
j∈S∪T vj = 1andvj ≥ 0forallj, wehave
P
j∈S vj ≤
1. That is, C(a+b) ≤ C(a+|S|b) ≤ 1. That is, C ≤
1
a+b. Hence,
for any j, vj ≤
atj+b
a+b . Let us recall that v
′
j =
atj+b
a+mb. Therefore,
for any j, vj
a+b
a+mb ≤ v
′
j.
Now we are ready to prove Claim 6.
PROOF OF CLAIM 6. Let   v1,   v2 ∈ V be any two type vectors.
Let S be the obtained social welfare (under LIP(a)) when the
agents report   v1 and   v2, respectively. Let M be the ﬁrst-best so-
cial welfare when the agents report   v1 and   v2, respectively. Let S
φ
be the obtained social welfare (under LIP(a)) when the agents re-
port φ(  v1) and φ(  v2), respectively. Let M
φ be the ﬁrst-best social
welfare when the agents report φ(  v1) and φ(  v2), respectively.
We consider what happens when agents report φ(  v1) and φ(  v2)
instead of   v1 and   v2. The allocation does not change. Since there
are m items and by Lemma 3 the valuation of an item goes up by
at most
b
a+mb, we have S
φ ≤ m
b
a+mb +S. Since by Lemma 3 the
valuation of an item goes down by at most a factor of
a+b
a+mb, we
have M
φ ≥
a+b
a+mbM. Therefore
S+m b
a+mb
a+b
a+mbM ≥
Sφ
Mφ. Since S ≥ 1
(as in the proof of Claim 2), we have
S+m b
a+mbS
a+b
a+mbM ≥
Sφ
Mφ. That is,
S
M ≥
a+b
a+2mb
Sφ
Mφ ≥
a+b
a+2mbα
W.Claim 6 implies that if we can get a lower bound on α
W, then by
multiplying it by
a+b
a+2mb, we get a lower bound on α. So, we now
focus on deriving a lower bound on the maximal competitive ratio
of LIP(a) considering only full ranked type vectors.
Let x,y be the agents’ valuations for item 1 (or any other item).
Without loss of generality, we assume x ≥ y. Since we are only
dealing with full ranked type vectors, we have x =
atx+b
a+mb for some
0 ≤ tx ≤ 1, where tx is the amount of artiﬁcial currency agent
1 spends on item 1 when she is the dictator. Similar observations
hold for y. That is, y =
aty+b
a+mb for some 0 ≤ ty ≤ 1, where ty
is the amount of artiﬁcial currency agent 2 spends on item 1 when
she is the dictator. Let u =
y
x. We have
b
a+b ≤ u ≤ 1.
Under LIP(a), the proportion of item 1 won by agent 1 when 1
is the dictator is
ln(atx+b)
a −
ln(b)
a . The proportion of item 1 won
by agent 1 when 1 is not the dictator is 1 −
ln(aty+b)
a +
ln(b)
a . In
total, the proportion of item 1 won by agent 1 is
1
2 +
ln( atx+b
aty+b )
2a =
1
2 +
ln( x
y )
2a =
− ln(u)
2a +
1
2. Similarly, the proportion of item 1 won
by agent 2 is
ln(u)
2a +
1
2.
We use R(x,y) to denote the sum of the agents’ utilities derived
from item 1 when the agents’ valuations for item 1 are x and y,
respectively (x ≥ y). Let θ(a) be deﬁned as the minimum ratio
between R(x,y) and x over all x,y. That is, θ(a) is the mini-
mum ratio of achieved utility over optimal utility for item 1 under
LIP(a), when we only consider full ranked vectors. θ(a) only
depends on a (not on m). We call it the intrinsic value of a.
CLAIM 7. The intrinsic value θ(a) is less than or equal to the
maximal competitive ratio of LIP(a) considering only full ranked
type vectors.
PROOF. By symmetry over the items, the achieved utility over
optimal utility for any item is at least θ(a). Hence, the maximal
competitive ratio is at least θ(a).
Let N be a large positive integer. Let h =
a
N(a+b) be the step
size. Let the ui be deﬁned as ui =
b
a+b + ih for i = 0,1,...,N.
We observe that
θ(a) = min
b
a+mb≤y≤x≤ a+b
a+mb
x(
− ln(u)
2a +
1
2) + y(
ln(u)
2a +
1
2)
x
= min
b
a+b≤u≤1
−ln(u)
2a
+
1
2
+
uln(u)
2a
+
u
2
≥ min
0≤i<N
min
ui≤u≤ui+h
(u − 1)ln(u)
2a
+
1
2
+
u
2
≥ min
0≤i<N
(ui + h − 1)ln(ui + h)
2a
+
1
2
+
ui
2
Given a, the ui are constants. The above expression is the min-
imum of N constants. It gives a lower bound on θ(a). We denote
it by θ(a). The following expression gives an upper bound on θ(a)
(denoted by θ(a)).
θ(a) = min
b
a+b≤u≤1
−ln(u)
2a
+
1
2
+
uln(u)
2a
+
u
2
≤ min
0<i≤N
(ui − 1)ln(ui)
2a
+
1
2
+
ui
2
≤ min
0≤i<N
(ui + h − 1)ln(ui + h)
2a
+
1
2
+
ui
2
+
h
2
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Figure 1: Obtained Competitive Ratios
That is, the obtained lower bound θ(a) and upper bound θ(a)
differ only by at most
h
2, which can be made arbitrarily small.
Sinceθ(a) ≤ α
W, wehavethatαisboundedbelowby
a+b
a+2mbθ(a).
8
Next, we prove that θ(a) serves as an upper bound on α.
9
CLAIM 8. θ(a) ≥ α.
PROOF. Let ¯ αbethemaximalcompetitiveratioofLIP(a)when
there are only two items. We have ¯ α ≥ α. Hence we only need to
show θ(a) ≥ ¯ α.
Forthecaseoftwoitems, letus considerthecasewhere agent 1’s
typevectoris(
u
u+1,
1
u+1), andagent2’stypevectoris(
1
u+1,
u
u+1).
Here,
b
a+b ≤ u ≤ 1. It is easy to see that these two type vec-
tors are full ranked. The utility of agent 1 under LIP(a) equals
u
u+1(
1
2 +
ln(u)
2a ) +
1
u+1(
1
2 +
− ln(u)
2a ). The utility of agent 2 is
the same. The ﬁrst-best social welfare is
2
u+1. So, ¯ α is at most
2
1
2+ u
u+1
ln(u)
2a + 1
u+1
− ln(u)
2a
2
u+1
=
u+1
2 + u
ln(u)
2a +
− ln(u)
2a .
Sinceucantakeanyvaluefrom
b
a+b to1, ¯ α ≤ min b
a+b≤u≤1
1
2+
u
2 +
u ln(u)
2a −
ln(u)
2a . The expression on the right side of the inequal-
ity is exactly θ(a).
Theorem 3 summarizes the development in this section.
THEOREM 3. For the case of m items and two agents, LIP(a)
is at least
a+b
a+2mbθ(a)-competitive, and at most θ(a)-competitive.
We illustrate the results in this section with Figure 1. For three
to one hundred items, we searched for the LIP mechanism (from
{LIP(a)|a = 0.01,0.02,0.03,...,20})thatmaximizes
a+b
a+2mbθ(a)
(the corresponding upper bounds θ(a) are also presented).
8When we compute this lower bound, we actually compute
a+b
a+2mbθ(a).
9When we compute this upper bound, we actually compute θ(a).6. LARGE NUMBERS OF ITEMS
We now show a negative result: as the number of items goes
to inﬁnity, any increasing-price mechanism (whether it is linear or
nonlinear) has maximal competitive ratio 0.5. That is, in the limit,
they are no more competitive than the mechanism that simply di-
vides the items evenly.
THEOREM 4. Forthecaseoftwoagents, asthenumberofitems
m goes to inﬁnity, the maximal competitive ratio of any increasing-
price mechanism is 0.5.
PROOF. Let M be any increasing-price mechanism, character-
ized by the price function f. Let the type vectors of the agents be
(
f(1)
f(1)+(m−1)f(0),
f(0)
f(1)+(m−1)f(0),...,
f(0)
f(1)+(m−1)f(0)) and
(1,0,...,0), respectively. Either agent, when she is the dictator,
will choose to spend all her artiﬁcial currency on item 1.
When agent 1 is the dictator, the social welfare under M equals
f(1)
f(1)+(m−1)f(0). When agent 2 is the dictator, the social welfare
under M equals 1 +
(m−1)f(0)
f(1)+(m−1)f(0). The social welfare under the
ﬁrst-best mechanism equals 1 +
(m−1)f(0)
f(1)+(m−1)f(0). The competitive
ratio of M is then at most
1
1+
(m−1)f(0)
f(1)+(m−1)f(0)
=
f(1)+(m−1)f(0)
f(1)+2(m−1)f(0).
As m → ∞, this ratio goes to 0.5. That is, the maximal com-
petitive ratio of any increasing-price mechanism is at most 0.5 as
m → ∞. On the other hand, 0.5 is a lower bound on the competi-
tive ratios of strategy-proof mechanisms by Claim 2.
7. FUTURE RESEARCH
One direction for future research is to ﬁnd out whether higher
competitive ratios can be achieved by focusing on other families of
strategy-proof mechanisms. We could also consider more general
settingsinwhichtheagentsmayexpresscomplementary/substitutable
preferences over the items.
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